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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating
to oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 1, 2009,
through September 30, 2010. The cases examined include deci-
sions of state and federal courts in the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.1
* Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
1. Cases of interest during the reporting period not examined herein include: Red
River Res. Inc. v. Wickford, Inc., 443 B.R. 74 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (temporary cessation of
production and lessor repudiation); PEC Minerals L.P. v. Chevron USA Inc., 737 F. Supp.
2d 643 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (production anywhere on lease holds multiple tracts/units); Parker
v. MSB Energy, Inc. (In re MSB Energy, Inc.), 438 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (shut-
in royalty payments, availability of pipeline, method, timing); Wickford, Inc. v. Energytec,
Inc. (In re Energytec, Inc.), No. 09-41477, (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2009) (lease force
majeure and TRC shut-in orders); Cole v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 331 S.W.3d 30 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2010, pet. denied) (surface use under mineral lease and unit agreement);
Simpson v. Curtis, No. 12-09-00292-CV, 2010 WL 3431856 (Tex. App.-Tyler Sept. 1, 2010,
no pet.) (reformation of deed for mutual mistake); Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operat-
ing, Inc., 330 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (fraud based on conceal-
ment of payout); Berthelot v. Brinkmann, 322 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet.
denied) (proceeds from gas plant operations are personal property); Jones v. Thompson,
338 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, no pet.) (Discovery Rule and TRC records);
Hausser v. Cuellar, No. 04-09-00560-CV, 2010 WL 2844046 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July
21, 2010, no pet.), withdrawn, 2011 WL 313757 (Feb. 2, 2011) (inconsistent fractions in
deed); Hudspeth v. Berry, No. 02-09-225-CV, 2010 WL 2813408 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
July 15, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (meaning of the "usual 1/8" royalty); Gulley v. Davis, 321
S.W.3d 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (adverse possession of joint
owner by enclosure); Anderson v. Shaw, No. 03-08-00352-CV, 2010 WL 2428132 (Tex.
App.-Austin June 18, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (ambiguous deed); Escondido Servs.,
LLC v. VKM Holdings, LP, 321 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, no pet.) (strip and
gore mineral conveyance); Swepi LP v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 314 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2010, pet. denied) (TRC Approval of contiguous subdivision plats for landfill oper-
ations); Lyle v. Jane Guinn Revocable Trust, No. 01-09-00081-CV, 2010 WL 1053060 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 11, 2010, pet. filed) (net profits interest or production
payment); Adobe Oilfield Servs., Ltd. v. Trilogy Operating, Inc., 305 S.W.3d 402 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2010, no pet.) (injunction against subcontractor liens on leasehold); Wine-
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II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES
Wiggins v. Cade held that a mineral conveyance satisfies the statute of
frauds if parol testimony can connect some data in the deed with some
definite land.2 In this case, Grantor conveyed the same non-participating
royalty interest to Grantee #1 and to Grantee #2 by separate deeds.
Grantee #2 alleged that the legal description in the prior deed did not
satisfy the statute of frauds "because it contained neither the name of the
survey or the abstract number in which the property was situated."'3 The
beginning point was identified in the deed as follows: "BEGINNING at
an offset corner, same being the northwest corner of a tract of 45 acres of
land formerly owned by Mrs. Kate Crook ....
Grantee #2's expert, a registered land surveyor, testified by affidavit
that "he could not locate the property on the ground with reasonable
certainty based on the legal description in the deeds because it contained
neither the name of the survey or the abstract number in which the prop-
erty was situated."5 Grantee #1's expert, a landman and a lawyer, testi-
fied by affidavit that he was able to identify the survey in which the
property was located by the reference in the legal description to the "45
acres of land formerly owned by Mrs. Kate Crook."6 "He stated that he
was able to determine this information from a search for Kate Crook in
the grantor/grantee indices of the Rusk County clerk's office," and he
then determined that there was only one "forty-five acre tract that Kate
Crook ever owned in Rusk County."'7
Under Texas law, "[a] recital of ownership in a deed may be used as an
element of description and may serve as a means, together with some
other element, of identifying the land with reasonable certainty."' 8 Inter-
preting this rule, Grantee #2 contended that the "deed must furnish
within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or
data by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable
certainty."9 This court held that "[a]n individual can use parol evidence
to connect data described in the instrument, such as the name of a land
gar v. Martin, 304 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (land conveyed/land
described); In re Estate of Slaughter, 305 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.)
(mineral/royalty distinction in will construction); Cherokee Cnty. Cogeneration Partners,
L.P. v. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade, 305 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no
pet.) (GPA consequential damages exclusion); Bright v. Johnson, 302 S.W.3d 483 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2009) (reservation or exception of minerals); City of Alvin v. Zindle, No.
14-08-00458-CV, 2009 WL 4573702 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 8, 2009, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (noting that lease does not sever royalty or reverter from surface).
2. Wiggens v. Cade, 313 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2010, pet. denied).
3. Id. at 470-71.




8. Id. (citing Broaddus v. Grout, 152 Tex. 398, 402, 310 (1953)).
9. Id. at 473.
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owner, to establish the sufficiency of a legal description." 10
The significance of this case is the holding that permits opinion testi-
mony to supplement the written deed to complete the legal description of
the property being conveyed."1 It does seem that on these facts and as
between these parties, it is possible with some effort to confirm the loca-
tion of the land with reasonable certainty. However, the public policy
behind the statute of frauds in promoting the certainty of land titles
should require something more certain than parol testimony based on a
partial title opinion of a neighbor's tract. A deed of real property must
be in writing, but this case holds that an essential element of the deed can
be supplied by parol testimony, and that testimony need not even be tes-
timony as to a fact, but can be opinion testimony from an expert wit-
ness.12 A title examiner examining title to Blackacre and faced with
similar facts, must now require an examination of title to Whiteacre. It
would not be surprising to find title issues as to Whiteacre. Must the
Whiteacre tract be "owned" for the legal description on Blackacre to be
enforceable? Is it enough that there is a deed into Mrs. Kate Crook on
Whiteacre, but she owns nothing?
In Masgas v. Anderson, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that
when a granting clause conveys all of Grantor's interest in certain oil and
leases described in an exhibit to the conveyance, all of Grantor's interest
is conveyed, even if a lease named in the exhibit was labeled with a per-
centage working interest that was less than all of grantor's interest.13 The
conveyance provided that:
[Grantor] ... CONVEYS... all of [grantor's] right, title and inter-
est in and to the oil and gas leases described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes....
[Grantor] ... does covenant.., that [Grantor] is the lawful owner
of said leases described in Exhibit "A." . . . [Grantor] further war-
rants that it is the owner of the working interest as set out beside
each leasehold estate named in Exhibit "A." 14
Part of the title was disputed at the time of the conveyance. Grantor
claimed that only the specified working interest on Exhibit "A" (which
did not include the disputed interest) was conveyed. 15
The court held that the plain grammatical meaning of the conveyance
provided that the Grantor conveyed "its entire interests in the leases de-
scribed in Exhibit 'A."116 "The reference to [Grantor's] fractional inter-
est was in the warranty provision. While [Grantor] assigned all of its
interests, it only warranted that it owned the fractional interests described
10. Id. (citing Ehlers v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 350 S.W.2d 567, 568-73 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1961, no writ)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 472.
13. Margas v. Anderson, 310 S.W.3d 567, 573 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, pet. denied).
14. Id. at 572.




in Exhibit 'A.' 17
The significance of the case is that it validated a common practice in
drafting purchase and sale agreements and conveyances when the terms
include a warranty, but grantor either does not own all of the leases or
grantor intends to limit grantor's liability on the warranty to a specified
interest. The intended result could have been more certain if the war-
ranty clause began: "Without limiting the terms of the grant herein, Gran-
tor warrants . .. ."
III. LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES
In Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, the First Houston Court of Appeals held: (1)
that the use of a weighted average price to calculate the payment of gas
royalties directly contradicted the "proceeds" or "amount realized" roy-
alty clause in the oil and gas lease, and (2) that pooling leased lands with
other acreage did not permit the lessee to pay royalties in a manner that
was inconsistent with the royalty provision.18 The lease provided that
Shell would pay the royalty owners a percentage of "the amounts realized
[by Shell] . . . from the sale of gas."'19 However, Shell did not use the
amounts realized to calculate the royalty payment. "Instead, Shell used a
'weighted average price,' which it calculated by [proportionately] weight-
ing its sales price" with the sales price of other working interest owners in
the pooled units.20 A royalty owner under Shell's oil and gas lease sued
"Shell for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud concerning
the underpayment of oil and gas royalties .... -21
Pursuant to pooling and unitization agreements, Shell pooled its leased
acreage with other lands, and it "received its share of the natural gas pro-
duced, based on the amount of land it contributed to the pooled unit. '22
Shell argued that the lease provision that permitted pooling also permit-
ted paying royalties based on a weighted average calculation because the
"provision does not say that it was only that portion produced and sold by
[Shell]; in fact, the implication is that it is the defined portion of all of the
production, including that sold by the other working interest owners. '23
The pooling provision in the lease "require[d] that Shell pay [royalty]
based on the production of natural gas allocated to the [lease]."' 24 The
amount of natural gas allocated to Shell's lease represented the percent-
age of the natural gas produced from the "total number of surface acres
in the unit" that the lease contributes to the unit.2 5 However, the pooling
17. Id.
18. Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, No. 01-08-00713-CV, 2010 WL 670549, at *6 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 2010, pet. granted).
19. Id.
20. Id. at *2.
21. Id. at *1.
22. Id. at *5.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *6.
25. Id.
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provision expressly provided that in allocating such production "the pay-
ment or delivery of royalty, overriding royalty, and any other payments
out of production, to be the entire production of unitized minerals from
the portion of said land covered hereby and included in such unit in the
same manner as though produced from said land under the terms of this
lease."'26 Accordingly, because the lease expressly required Shell to calcu-
late royalty payments based on proceeds or on the amount realized, and
the pooling provision provided that "the payment or delivery of royalty"
should be "in the same manner as though produced from said land under
the terms of this lease,"'27 by using a weighted average calculation, Shell
breached its contractual obligations under the lease.28
The jury found that Shell fraudulently concealed the underpayment of
royalties, and the trial court ordered that Lessor recover the royalty
amounts that Shell underpaid between 1988 and 1997.29 The court stated,
"Generally, a defendant's fraudulent concealment of wrongdoing will toll
the running of limitations. '30 However, fraudulent concealment does not
toll the statute of limitations if a plaintiff "discovers the wrong or could
have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence."'3'
This case is significant because it is consistent with a long line of cases
holding that the agreement to pay or deliver royalty is a contractual obli-
gation, and the manner in which royalties are payable or deliverable is
determined by the terms of the lease.32 In construing the royalty and
pooling clauses together, the court found nothing in the pooling clause
varied the method provided in the royalty clause for payment of royalty,
except that the production constructively allocated to the lease was deter-
mined by the surface acreage formula.33
In Ramsey v. Grizzle, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a lease
termination claim based upon the continuous operations clause must be
tried as an action in trespass to try title.34 The lease was beyond the pri-
mary term and production from the lease well was intermittent for sev-
eral years.35 The lease was for the specified term:
[A]nd as long thereafter as operations, as hereinafter defined, are
conducted upon said land with no cessation for more than ninety
(90) consecutive days. Whenever used in this lease the word "opera-
tions" shall mean operations for and any of the following: drilling,
testing, completing, reworking, recompleting, deepening, plugging
back or repairing of a well in search for or in an endeavor to obtain
production of oil, gas, sulphur or other minerals, excavating a mine,
26. Id. at *5.
27. Id. at *6.
28. Id.
29. Id. at *4.
30. Id. at *7.
31. Id. at *8 (quoting Kerlin v. Sauceda, 263 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Tex. 2008)).
32. See id. at *6.
33. Ramsey v. Grizzle, 313 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 501.
20111
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production of oil, gas, sulphur or other mineral, whether or not in
paying quantities.36
There were multiple parties and multiple claims, but simplified, Lessor
sought a declaration that the lease had terminated, and Lessee sought a
declaration that the lease continued to be in force and effect.37 Exten-
sive, detailed, and conflicting testimony and evidence were admitted for
several different time periods during which it was alleged that there was
no production and no operations sufficient to preserve the lease.38 The
case was tried as if it were a suit with competing claims for declaratory
judgment. The issue as submitted to the jury placed the burden on lessor
to prove that lessee had failed to commence drilling or operations on the
well within ninety days after the well ceased to produce oil and gas. The
jury answered "no."'39
The court recognized that placing the burden of proof was essentially
outcome-determinative in this case.40 The court determined that the case
could only be tried in trespass to try title.41 The court reasoned that the
termination of a fee simple determinable determined title to the mineral
estate, and that "trespass to try title claim is [generally] the exclusive
method in Texas for adjudicating disputed claims of title to real prop-
erty. '" 42 Furthermore, the court stated that "when the suit does not in-
volve the construction or validity of deeds or other documents of title, the
suit is not one for declaratory judgment. '43
The court treated the case as a "trespass to try title" case.44 The court
stretched to find all of the necessary elements required by the statutory
proceeding, particularly the requirement that the Lessee must prove up
his own title.45
The court considered Lessee's title to effectively be an undisputed is-
sue.46 Therefore, the court focused on cessation of operations causing the
possible termination of that title as the real issue.47 There was not a dis-
pute about the nature of the operations in this case. After citing existing
authority for the principle that offsite preparatory work is not sufficient,
but work on site is sufficient, the court found that this case turned on the
credibility of the evidence. 48 There is a useful summary of the kind of
evidence that both sides used to present their case (e.g., Texas Railroad
36. Id. at 507.
37. Id. at 501.
38. Id. at 508-10.
39. Id. at 507.
40. Id. at 501.
41. Id. at 502-04.
42. Id. at 502-03.
43. Id. at 503.
44. Id. at 504 (stating "since the case involves title to real property, we will analyze it
as a trespass to try title case regardless of the term or classification of the suit by the
parties").
45. Id. at 504-05.
46. Id. at 506.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 508-09.
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Commission records, pumper records, electric bills, equipment and ser-
vice invoices, testimony, etc.). The evidence presented by Lessee was
weak but good enough to secure a favorable jury finding, and the court
refused to hold that the finding was against the great weight and prepon-
derance of the evidence.49 Lessee won, but the court reversed the award
of over $49,000 in attorney's fees awarded to Lessee because there is no
provision for recovery of fees for a trespass to try title suit in the Texas
Property Code.50
The significance of this case is the clear holding that a lease termination
case based on the continuous operations clause must be tried as an action
in trespass to try title. 51 Notwithstanding this case, it is unlikely that a
case tried under another theory can meet the formal requirements of a
proceeding in trespass to try title. The case is also useful in suggesting the
sources of possible evidence on lease termination, and it offers hope to
any lessee whose operations "went to hell."'52 Finally, the case continues
the recent spate of decisions returning to trespass to try title as the
method of determining title claims in Texas, with the consequence that
the prevailing party is denied the recovery of attorney's fees that may
otherwise have been recoverable in a suit for a declaratory judgment.5 3
McCammon v. Ischy held that to prevail in trespass to try title, a plain-
tiff lessee must establish superior title to a common source of title, which
requires a complete chain of title by documents, or establish title by prior
possession, which requires some proof of actual possession. 54 In 2000,
Ischy acquired leasehold title under leases that covered both producing
and non-producing tracts. In 2003, McCammon acquired a lease on a
certain 169.1-acre tract of land, which he believed was open because there
was no production on the tract. In 2004, McCammon obtained a drilling
permit and a title opinion.55 The title examiner called for releases or an
"affidavit of non-production for the land covered by two 1989 leases,"
which covered the 169.1-acre tract and other lands.56 In the summer of
2004, "viewing these title issues as mere formalities," McCammon drilled
a producing well on the 169.1-acre tract. 57 In August 2004, McCammon
discovered that one of the two 1989 leases, which included McCammon's
169.1-acre tract, also included a tract on which Ischy had a producing
well. That is, both Ischy's lease and McCammon's lease covered the
169.1-acre tract.58
The case was tried in a trespass to try title action in which Ischy was
49. Id. at 509-10.
50. Id. at 511 (citing Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex. 2004)).
51. Id. at 504.
52. Id. at 502.
53. Id. at 502, 508.
54. McCammon v. Ischy, No. 03-06-00707-CV, 2010 WL 1930149, at *3, 6-7 (Tex.
App.-Austin May 12, 2010, pet. filed).
55. Id. at *1.
56. Id.




aligned as plaintiff.59 Ischy won in the trial court, and the jury found that
McCammon had not acted in good faith. "The [trial] court ordered Mc-
Cammon to turn over operations," all of the equipment, and "almost $1
million dollars being held in suspense to Ischy." 60
To prevail in a trespass to try title action, a plaintiff must do one of
the following: (1) prove a regular chain of conveyances from the sov-
ereign, (2) establish superior title out of a common source, (3) prove
title by limitations, or (4) prove title by prior possession coupled with
proof that possession was not abandoned. 61
Ischy sought to preserve his win on appeal under either (2) superior
title out of a common source or (4) prior possession.62
It was established that a certain 1951 deed was a common source of
title for both Ischy and McCammon, but Ischy offered no documentary
evidence to establish the subsequent chain of title. Ischy tried to rely on
testimony from McCammon's title attorney.63 A plaintiff in trespass to
try title is required to establish the chain of title to the common source by
documents, and gaps in the chain of title cannot be filled by testimony. 64
Witnesses may be called to explain the documents but not to fill gaps in
the chain.65 Because documentary evidence is required, Ischy failed to
establish superior title to McCammon from a common source.66
The issue submitted on prior possession asked "Was Noel Ischy law-
fully in possession of the subject property when [McCammon] entered
upon same?" 67 "Subject property" was defined as the 169.1-acre tract.
Thus, the issue as submitted did not ask about Ischy's producing tract but
only about the 169.1-acre tract. McCammon argued that possession of oil
or gas requires actual drilling and production of oil or gas, and, because
there was no evidence that Ischy had ever produced any oil or gas from
the 169.1-acre tract, Ischy had failed to prove possession. 68 McCammon
relied upon the Texas Supreme Court Case, Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v.
P001,69 which held that actual drilling and production was required to
prove possession in the context of adverse possession of minerals. 70 The
Austin Court of Appeals in this case did not clearly adopt this reasoning
but recited it in holding that there was no evidence to support Ischy's
claim of prior possession.7' There was no evidence of anything except
59. Id. at *1.
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id. at *3 (citing Land v. Turner, 377 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. 1964)).
62. Id. at *2.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *5.
65. Id. at *4.
66. Id. at *4-5.
67. Id. at *5.
68. Id. at *6.
69. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. 2003).
70. Id.
71. McCammon, 2010 WL 1930149, at *6.
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Ischy's record title.72 This leaves open the question of exactly what is
required to show prior possession in the context of leasehold interests in
trespass to try title.
The court reversed and rendered, which is a dramatic change in circum-
stances for the parties, essentially turning on the formalities of proof re-
quired in an action for trespass to try title.73 The court stated, "[i]f the
plaintiff fails to establish his title, the effect of a take nothing judgment
against him is to vest title in the defendant. ' '74 Title and possession of the
169.1-acre mineral estate, including all equipment and improvements, was
vested in McCammon. Presumably, Ischy could have preserved his trial
court victory if the evidence had included an abstract of title. The signifi-
cance of the case is the technical nature of the decision, which has always
been a part of this statutory proceeding, and the case highlights the un-
resolved question of what constitutes possession of oil and gas when there
are multiple tracts and when the issue is ownership of oil and gas.
In Holland v. Thompson, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the
discovery rule did not toll the running of limitations on claims for fraud
when the true facts could have been discovered in the records of the
Texas Railroad Commission (TRC).75 Holland held a one forty-eighth
beneficial interest in the minerals underlying lands in Crockett County,
Texas, owned and administered by the Bailey Estate Trust (Bailey Es-
tate). Thompson was the operator and owner of the "majority working
interest in the oil and gas leases on the Bailey Estate. '76 In 1997, Thomp-
son filed an application with the TRC to amend field rules related to well
spacing which would allow for further development of the Bailey Estate.
The TRC approved Thompson's application in September of 1997. The
TRC examiner's findings of fact recited that Thompson planned to drill at
least fifteen wells, although there was a factual dispute as to whether
Thompson did or did not have such a plan. There was other evidence in
the TRC records of the value of the lands in the Bailey Estate. Thomp-
son did not drill any new wells. 77
In 1998, after learning that "his cousin had sold his mineral interest in
the Bailey Estate to Thompson," Holland approached Thompson about
selling Holland's interest to Thompson. 78 Thompson offered Holland
$9,000 for his interest, a figure he arrived at by multiplying the value of
the past year's production by four. There were apparently multiple rep-
resentations that the lease was played out with little hope for future de-
velopment. Thompson purchased Holland's interest for $9,027.27 in
72. Id. at *7.
73. Id. at *1.
74. Id. at *3 (citing Hejl v. Wirth, 343 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1961)).
75. Holland v. Thompson, 338 S.W.3d 586, 595 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, pet.
denied).
76. Id. at 590.
77. Id. at 591.




In late 2003, Thompson entered into a farmout agreement, and soon
thereafter, the farmee began drilling on the Bailey Estate.80 When the
farmee drilled into deeper undeveloped natural gas reserves, Thompson
received more than $400,000 in royalties directly attributable to the inter-
est he purchased from Holland.81
Holland sued Thompson for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and money
had and received.8 2 Thompson filed traditional and no-evidence motions
for summary judgment on various grounds, including that Holland's suit
was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted
summary judgment without stating its reasons.83
On appeal, Holland argued the discovery rule tolled the accrual of his
causes of action until the farmee began drilling in 2004.84 The court
noted that "[t]he discovery rule only applies when the nature of the plain-
tiff's injury is both inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifia-
ble. '8 5 The court reasoned that "'owners of an interest in the mineral
estate . . . ha[ve] some obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in pro-
tecting their interests,'"8 6 including examining additional sources of in-
formation such as TRC and lessee records.8 7
The court held that Thompson's 1997 TRC filings and, specifically, the
TRC examiner's finding of fact that "Thompson plan[ned] to drill at least
15 wells" should have given Holland reason to inquire about future pro-
duction on the Bailey Estate.88 In affirming the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment and holding Jones's damages were not "inherently
undiscoverable," the court stated:
Even a cursory review of the 1997 application would have revealed
the possibility that significant reserves existed on the Bailey leases in
the Ozona NE. (Canyon 7520) Field because the Gas Proration
Schedule listed them. And regardless of whether Thompson later de-
nied that he planned to drill fifteen wells, a prudent mineral interest
owner would certainly have reason to inquire about future produc-
tion based on [Thompson's petroleum engineer's] representations in
the application.8 9
Thompson's evidence on the data available at the TRC was based on
affidavits from two petroleum engineers who testified that engineers rely
79. Id.
80. Id. at 591.
81. Id.
82. Id. (Holland's cousin filed a parallel suit in Jones v. Thompson, 338 S.W.3d 573,
579 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, pet. denied).
83. Id. at 592.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 594 (citing Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex.
1996)).
86. Id. (quoting HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998)).
87. Id. (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2001)).
88. Id. at 591.
89. Id. at 595.
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on TRC records and on the kinds of records available in 1998.90
The significance of this case is the court's holding that TRC filings put a
mineral interest owner on notice of the potential for future lease
development. 91
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS
Preston Exploration Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp. held that for a
Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) to be enforceable, the leases de-
scribed on the exhibit to the PSA must be identified by reference to the
volume and page where the leases are recorded.92 In June of 2008, Ches-
apeake agreed to purchase oil and gas leases from Preston in two Texas
counties. Over the next several months, the parties negotiated the terms
of the PSA, exchanged multiple drafts by e-mail of the schedules and
exhibits describing the leases to be conveyed, and delayed the proposed
closing date several times.93 There was a proposed closing date of Octo-
ber 7, 2008, which was delayed at the last minute by agreement to No-
vember 7, 2008, but only after Chesapeake paid to Preston a non-
refundable deposit of approximately $11,000,000. Also on October 7,
there was agreement on some final changes to the PSA, and Preston sent
a series of e-mails to Chesapeake that afternoon which included a set of
PSA exhibits and a set of assignment exhibits. Chesapeake did not re-
view the assignment exhibits and focused on reviewing the PSA exhibits,
which were not identical to the assignment exhibits. There were some
agreed changes to the PSA exhibits on October 7, and, late on October 7,
Preston signed the PSA with the PSA exhibits attached. The assignment
exhibits were not physically attached to the PSA signed by Preston. On
October 8, there were a few more agreed changes to the PSA exhibits,
and Chesapeake then executed and returned to Preston the signature
pages to the PSA.94 Chesapeake did not close on November 7, Preston
promptly filed suit,95 and Chesapeake counterclaimed for return of the
non-refundable deposit. 96
Chesapeake's defense was based on the statute of frauds.97 The statute
of frauds requires that to be enforceable a contract purporting to sell oil
and gas leases "'must furnish within itself or by reference to some other
existing writing, the means or data by which the land to be conveyed may
be identified with reasonable certainty."' 98 The PSA exhibits as prepared
by Preston contained "the name of the lessee, the effective date of the
90. Id. at 590.
91. See id.
92. Preston Exploration Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660(S.D. Tex. 2010).
93. Id. at 665-66.
94. Id. at 666-67.
95. Id. at 667.
96. Id. at 668-69.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 660 (quoting Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972)).
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lease, the gross acres leased, the royalty of the lease, and the net revenue
interest in the property," and apparently also the name of the lessor, the
survey, the lease term, and the net acreage. 99 The PSA exhibits also
showed Preston's unique internal lease identification number for each
lease, which correlated to the numbered lease files in Preston's office that
contained a hard copy of the lease itself or a data sheet with the metes
and bounds description for that particular lease. 100 The assignment ex-
hibits, unlike the PSA exhibits, included the volume and page where the
various leases were recorded. 10 1 The case generally turned upon an anal-
ysis of the adequacy of the descriptions used on the various schedules and
exhibits and upon determining which documents collectively comprised
the agreement of the parties. 10 2
To be effective under the statute of frauds, the description cannot re-
quire a search of the public records in order to arrive at the location of
the property that corresponds to each lease. 10 3 "The data set forth within
the PSAs [did] not inherently contain such identifying information."'10 4
"By contrast, had the volume and page number information for each of
the leases been included in the PSA exhibits, this would have constituted
an explicit reference to the public records containing the required loca-
tion information. This distinction between characteristic data versus vol-
ume and page information is crucial .... "o105
Public real property records ... can be considered only if they are
attached to or referenced in the contract. Here, with the data con-
tained in the PSA exhibits, it is the search of the public records,
which are wholly extrinsic to the data provided, that allows the prop-
erty corresponding to each lease to be identified. If volume and page
information had been provided, by contrast, the public records
would have been explicitly referenced within the writing and thereby
incorporated into the agreement. In that case, therefore, extrinsic
evidence would have been wholly unnecessary to discern location
information. 0 6
Similarly, the court stated that Preston's internal lease identification
numbers were insufficient because the "number[s] require[d] extrinsic
testimony or evidence before their significance [could] be ascertained." 10 7
Therefore, "the PSAs [did] not satisfy the statute of frauds because they
failed to disclose the location and boundaries of the properties corre-
sponding to the leases to be conveyed.' 0 8
99. Id. at 659 n.2.
100. Id. at 660.
101. Id. at 660, 668.
102. See id. at 668.
103. Id. at 659.
104. Id. at 660.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 659-60.
107. Id. at 661.
108. Id. at 659.
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The court then considered whether the assignment exhibits (which con-
tained recording references) were incorporated into the agreement of the
parties, although not physically attached to the PSA.109 The court held
that in the modern era of remote closings and electronic documents there
has to be "a more flexible approach to the statute of frauds. 11 °
"[S]ending several documents over email prior to the execution... could
function in the same way as physically attaching all these documents
when the contract was signed."' The act of "sending the documents [via
e-mail] raises the logical presumption that the documents constitute part
of the 'package' . . . reviewed prior to the signing of the agreement.'
' 1 2
Limiting the statute of frauds in this electronic age by saying documents
must be physically attached when exchanged would be contrary to the
statute's purpose.113
However, in this case, the court found that the assignment exhibits
were not "finalized documents" because the parties had not agreed upon
the terms of the assignment Exhibits at the time the PSA was signed.
Pursuant to basic contract law, if the exhibits are not final upon the exe-
cution of the PSA and there is not a meeting of the minds, they cannot be
considered part of the parties' agreement.1 14 Therefore, the agreement of
the parties included no description of the leases to be conveyed, except
the inadequate description on the PSA Exhibits.
Finally, the court held that Chesapeake could not recover the non-re-
fundable deposit.1 5 Even though the PSA was ultimately held to be un-
enforceable, Chesapeake did receive the consideration for which it
bargained-a delay in making a decision on whether to close."
6
The significance of this case is the application of the statute of frauds to
a PSA and exhibits attached to a PSA. Even if the location of the leases
can be determined with absolute certainty by reference to extrinsic infor-
mation, if the actual legal location of the leases is not determinable from
the exhibit itself, the exhibit will not comply with the statute of frauds."
17
Listing the volume and page number of the recording information for the
leases being conveyed on the exhibit will incorporate the leases by refer-
ence and will satisfy the statute of frauds requirement." 8 The case is also
significant for its discussion of electronic or remote closings and the treat-
ment of electronic exhibits under the statute of frauds.
In Valence Operating Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., the Texarkana
Court of Appeals held that it is a question of fact as to whether non-
consent operations are timely commenced under a joint operating agree-
109. Id. at 662.
110. Id. at 662-63.
111. Id. at 662.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 663.
114. Id. at 668.
115. Id. at 669-70.
116. Id. at 669.
117. Id. at 659-60.
118. Id. at 660.
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ment, if there is doubt or controversy as to the intent of the party claim-
ing to have commenced operations for drilling by performing preparatory
acts.119 Under the terms of the joint operating agreement, Valence as
non-operator proposed to drill four wells, and the operator, Anadarko,
went non-consent. Valence became the operator and was required to
commence work on the wells by a certain date under Article VI.B.2 of
the joint operating agreement. 120 Before the deadline passed, Valence
prepared an authorization for expenditures, received a topographic map
of locations, staked the location, took pictures of well sites, obtained pre-
liminary lists of instruments regarding title, and did other off-site prepar-
atory work. All other preparatory work performed by Valence, such as
building access roads, restaking well locations, securing title opinions,
signing drilling contracts, and the actual commencement of drilling, all
occurred after the deadline.' 21 When the deadline passed, Anadarko
brought suit against Valence for breach of contract. 122
The principal issue was "whether [Valence] actually commenced work
on its proposed operation ... within the time frame specified by a joint
operating agreement."'1 23 "Actual drilling is not necessary in order to
comply with an obligation to commence operations for drilling as re-
quired by ... joint operating agreements. Preparatory activities such as
building access roads to the drill site [and preparing the drill site for drill-
ing] are usually sufficient if they are performed with the bona fide inten-
tion to proceed with ... the well."' 124 Valence's acts could be categorized
as "backroom preparations" because there was almost "no on-site activ-
ity."'125 "Both Valence and Anadarko contended at trial that the issue...
was a question of law ... [t]he trial court, however, concluded that the
issue was not established as a matter of law and submitted the issue to the
jury . ."126 The appellate court agreed and held that "[i]f there is doubt
or controversy as to the intent of the party claiming to have commenced
operations ...by performing preparatory acts, the question is one of
mixed law and fact and should be submitted to the jury."'1 27 The court
found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and it
appears that the key fact was the insignificant on-site activity. 128
The opinion is silent as to the underlying claim and judgment, but it is
likely that the real issue was whether Anadarko would suffer the non-
consent penalty as provided in the joint operating agreement. Anadarko
119. Valence Operating Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 303 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.).
120. Id. at 439.
121. Id. at 440.
122. Id. at 439.
123. Id. at 438.
124. Id. at 441 (citing Dorsett v. Valence Operating Co., 111 S.W.3d 224, 230 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2003, rev'd on other grounds, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 439.
127. Id. at 441.
128. Id.
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was awarded a judgment on its contract claim plus interest at six per-
cent. 129 Although the opinion is sketchy, it suggests that the proposing
party who fails to timely commence operations on site is assuming all the
risk and risking the loss of the benefit of the non-consent penalty in the
joint operating agreement.
In Reeder v. Wood County Energy L.L.C., the Tyler Court of Appeals
held that by ratification and quasi-estoppel an operator of a well is bound
by the terms of a joint operating agreement entered into by his predeces-
sor "when the [new] operator recognizes its validity by acting and per-
forming under its terms, as well as affirmatively acknowledging it," and
"accept[ing] the benefits and authorities of being the unit operator. '130
The case also held that an operator may be liable in damages for the
value of lost production if the operator fails to preserve the unit by opera-
tions or fails to offer a well to the non-operators prior to plugging and
abandoning that well.131 The Forest Hill Field Harris Sand Unit (Harris
Sand Unit), created in 1965, and the Forest Hill Field Sub-Clarksville
Unit (Sub-Clarksville Unit), created in 1975, overlapped. Oil was being
produced from both in 1995, when both units were owned entirely by
David Fry (Fry) or companies controlled by him. When Fry conveyed an
interest to an unrelated company in 1996, the parties entered into a Joint
Operating Agreement (JOA), which established a sharing scheme allocat-
ing interests in wellbores between the units. 132 It also required the opera-
tor to ensure that the units produced in paying quantities1 33 and, before
abandoning an unproductive or defective well, to offer the well to the
other parties.134
Two years after the parties entered into the JOA, Wendell Reeder ac-
quired an interest in the units and became the operator. After assuming
control, "Reeder refused to allow [the other parties] to use any of the
wellbores he controlled.., from the Sub-Clarksville Unit.1 35 "In 2003,
[Well No. 116] began to leak," and the Texas Railroad Commission
("TRC") initially recommended and later ordered Reeder to plug the
well. 136 Without offering Well No. 116 to the other parties, Reeder
plugged the well in 2004.137 By September 2006, all production had
ceased from the Harris Sand Unit, "and Reeder did nothing.' 38 "[T]he
unit expired, and the leases not held by production from other zones were
lost."1 39 The trial court rendered judgment for Fry and others based on
129. Id. at 445.
130. Reeder v. Wood Country Energy L.L.C., 320 S.W.3d 440, 443 (Tex. App.-Tyler
2010, pet. filed).
131. Id. at 446-47.
132. Id. at 439.
133. Id. at 445.
134. Id. at 446-47.
135. Id. at 439.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 447.




the jury's findings that Reeder breached the JOA by failing to maintain
production and by failing to offer Well No. 116 to the other parties. 140
Damages were measured by the value of the lost production. 141
On appeal, Reeder argued that the JOA did not apply to him. 142 The
court held that the JOA was indeed applicable to Reeder because (1)
"operating agreement[s] [are] typically in effect for as long as any of the
oil and gas leases subject to the JOA remain in effect," (2) "Reeder ac-
knowledged receiving the JOA" upon acquiring his interest in the Sand
Hill Unit, (3) Reeder acknowledged that he was the operator, (4) Reeder
ratified the agreement by acting and performing under its terms, and (5)
because the doctrine of quasi-estoppel applied.1 43 Moreover, the unit
agreements provided that the terms relating to the operator and opera-
tions were binding upon assignees and were covenants running with the
land. 144
Reeder next claimed that he was protected from liability by the excul-
patory clause in the JOA. 145 Under the terms of the JOA, which included
a common form of exculpatory clause, the operator would not be liable
unless the operator's "actions amounted to gross negligence or willful
misconduct."' 46 The court held that the exculpatory clause was not appli-
cable to breach of contract claims. 147 The exculpatory clause is only ap-
plicable "to claims that the operator failed to act as a reasonably prudent
operator in its operations in the contract area" as described in the JOA,
and the gross negligence standard does not apply to breach of contract
claims. 148 The distinction was particularly significant in this case because
the case had been tried and submitted on the gross negligence stan-
dard.149 Reeder sought to reverse the judgment based on no evidence or
insufficient evidence of gross negligence. The court of appeals held that
the case should not have been decided under the gross negligence stan-
dard; therefore, the issue on appeal was whether there was no evidence
or insufficient evidence to support a simple breach of contract. 150
The court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding that Reeder breached the JOA by failing to maintain
production. 15' There was an unusual provision incorporated into the
JOA in this case that provided that the operator "agrees to produce and/
or conduct operations on the Harris Sand Unit sufficient to maintain the
140. Id. at 439.
141. Id. at 448-50.
142. Id. at 442.
143. Id. at 442-43.
144. Id. at 442.
145. Id. at 443-44, 448.
146. Id. at 443-44.
147. Id. at 444.
148. Id. at 443.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 444-45.
151. Id. at 446.
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leases and the unit. '' 152 Fry owned a carried working interest, and Reeder
asserted that he maintained production until it became financially bur-
densome to perform and that the other non-operators failed to invest
money in the unit. The court of appeals held that financial burden cannot
excuse performance of contractual obligations. 153 The court was careful
to recite that its holding was based on the unique, explicit provisions of
this particular JOA, and that it was not holding that an operator could be
required to conduct an operation if the non-operators elected not to par-
ticipate. 154 Reeder never proposed an operation.155
The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding that Reeder breached the JOA by failing to offer Well No.
116 to the non-operators before he abandoned it.156 "Reeder argue[d]
that he was under no obligation to notify the other parties because he did
not elect to plug the well, but was ordered by the Railroad Commis-
sion.' 57 The court held that the evidence showed that before he was
ordered to close the well, [t]he [TRC] initially recommended that he plug
the well."'1 58 Reeder could have plugged or repaired the well. 159 His de-
cision not to repair amounted to a decision to plug; thus, he was obligated
to offer the well to the other parties. 160
There is a formal procedure for changing the operator of a well under
the rules and regulations of the TRC.161 Until there is a formal transfer,
the old operator continues to be responsible, so the parties to a transfer
of operations generally comply with those requirements. 162 However, the
transfer of authority to act as operator under a JOA sometimes just "hap-
pens," and the parties do not formally comply with the JOA or document
the transition. This case articulates the circumstances and theories under
which the transfer may become binding, even though there is no formal
election or assumption of operations by the new operator. The case also
highlights the significant liability that may attach (value of lost produc-
tion) if the operator fails to comply with the operator's duties. The obli-
gation to maintain the leases and the unit is not common, but the
obligation to give notice prior to plugging and abandoning a well is very
common.
In Bonn Operating Co. v. Devon Energy Production Co., the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that a notice of a proposed well under a Joint
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Huffines v. Swor & Gravel Co., 750 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, no writ).
154. Id. at 446, n.4. Cf Reeder v. Wood Cnty. Energy L.L.C., No. 12-08-00175-CV,
2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3080, at *38 n.4 (Tex. App.-Tyler April 28, 2010), withdrawn, 320
S.W.3d 433, 446 n.9 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2010, pet. filed).
155. Reeder, 320 S.W.3d at 446.
156. Id.




161. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1(a)(1), (4), (7) (2011).
162. Id. § 3.780)(2).
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Operating Agreement (JOA) was effective, even though notice was given
after the well was already drilled and completed. 163 This JOA was on a
610 Model Form Operating Agreement-1956 and contained the subse-
quent operations clause providing that "if a party desires to drill a well it
'may give the other party written notice of the proposed operation.'"1 64
"[T]he other parties to the JOA have 30 days" to respond. 65 Non-con-
senting parties are not liable for the costs of the proposed operation.
166 If
the operation is successful, the non-consenting parties are effectively pe-
nalized by the loss of their share of production until the participating par-
ties recover the costs of the drilling operation and of production
operations multiplied by the agreed penalty factor, such as 300%.167
Devon, the operator, sent notice to Bonn, a non-operator, after Devon's
well was already down and completed. Bonn affirmatively elected to go
non-consent. Bonn then sued Devon alleging breach of contract because
the notice was not timely and because Devon charged Bonn for costs
incurred before the well was spudded and after it was completed.
168
"In Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, the operator sent notice .. .
[before commencing operations,] . . . but then commenced operations
before the thirty-day period to elect to participate expired."169 The Texas
Supreme Court held that nothing in the language of the JOA forbade the
operator from commencing work before the end of the notice period.'
70
In this case, the Fifth Circuit extended that reasoning to hold that there
was nothing in the language of the JOA that forbade the operator from
commencing work and even completing the well before sending the no-
tice.171 Note, however, that it was the operator who commenced opera-
tions without notice. Should a non-operator attempt to commence
operations without timely notice, it is likely that different issues would be
raised and a different result would follow.
Bonn also sought to limit the costs included for purposes of calculating
the payout of the non-consent penalty. Bonn argued (under Section III
of the Accounting Procedures in Exhibit C to the JOA) that "the proper
time period for the accumulation of penalty costs is from the date the well
is spudded (the date the drill bit pierces the surface of the earth) until
completion (commencement of production)." 172 The Fifth Circuit held
that Bonn was misreading Section II.4.173 Section III related to charging
different rates for overhead based on the drilling rate or the production
163. Bonn Operating Co. v. Devon Energy Prod., 613 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2010).




168. Id. at 533-34.
169. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex. 2005).
170. Id. at 662-63.
171. Bonn, 613 F.3d at 535-36.
172. Id. at 535.
173. Id. at 534.
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rate. 174 "[Section III did] not limit [the participating parties'] ability to
charge non-consenting parties for all direct costs, and associated penal-
ties, applicable to a well pursuant to the terms of Paragraph 12 of the
JOA.1 75 Specifically, Devon could charge for costs incurred before drill-
ing and after completion. 176
The significance of the case is the holding that the operator can send
the notice of the proposed operation essentially at anytime, with the only
"risk" being that the non-operator gets a free look before making his
election. The opinion does not address access issues or the sharing of
well data prior to an election being made. The holding in this case and in
Valence should be presumed applicable to simple JOAs on simple facts.
Under more complex agreements and facts, a different result might fol-
low. For example, many JOAs have additional provisions that may in-
clude limitations on the number and timing of well proposals, priority of
operations, et cetera. Construing these provisions against a backdrop of
random notice periods and election periods could be difficult.
In Beckham Resources, Inc. v. Mantle Resources, L.L.C., the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals held that an area of mutual interest clause
(AMI) in an exploration agreement, which required notice of "all perti-
nent terms" of any acquisition, did not require notice in the form of a
liquidated sum as to the entire cost of the acquisition, but only the terms
of the participation. 177 Mantle Resources, L.L.C (Mantle) acquired a
new lease within the AMI that included a drilling commitment for a deep
well as consideration for the lease. 178 Mantle's notice of the acquisition
to Beckham included "specific discussions of the consideration for the
lease being the agreement to drill a deep well, copies of the October 2005
lease, [authorities for expenditure] for the estimated drilling costs, and
diagrams showing the proposed well location.1 79 Beckham had twenty
days to respond, Beckham failed to respond, and a failure to respond was,
under the terms of the AMI, deemed an election not to participate. Man-
tle drilled the well. 180 Beckham contended that "Mantle breached the
AMI provision because it did not send notice or an offer to participate to
Beckham once the acquisition costs became known and ascertainable
when the well reached 9,000 feet in February 2006."181
The court of appeals concluded that the AMI required only "that Beck-
ham be informed of the terms for its participation-i.e., that Beckham
would be responsible for its share of the up-front costs of the considera-




177. Beckham Res., Inc. v. Mantle Res., L.L.C., No. 13-09-00083-CV, 2010 WL 672880,
at *8 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
178. Id. at *4.
179. Id. at *8.
180. Id. at *6.




The holding is consistent with the trend in recently decided cases involv-
ing a right of first refusal (ROFR), although none were cited in the opin-
ion. The trend may be summarized as holding that the party with the
ROFR must unequivocally exercise it or lose it. Claims as to the suffi-
ciency of the notice are generally given little consideration, and even val-
uation disputes may be postponed for resolution until sometime after the
right is exercised. Similarly, in this case, the exact cost would not be
known until the well was drilled, but the pertinent term was that the con-
sideration was to drill the commitment well.
In re Moose Oil & Gas Co. considers whether a lessor of lands included
within a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) has rights to sue under the
JOA, either as a third-party beneficiary of the JOA or by virtue of having
privity of estate. 183 Two adjacent tracts of land were leased in 1996 by
landowners Barnes and Baker. In 1998, the Barnes Lease and Baker
Lease were pooled into a single unit. The working interest owners in the
unit entered into a Working Interest Unit Agreement (WIUA) and an
attached JOA.184 Moose, one of the non-operators and one of the lessees
under the Baker Lease, proposed drilling two additional wells in the
pooled unit under the terms of the JOA.18 5 The operator, who was the
lessee under the Barnes Lease, elected to go non-consent.1 8 6 Moose,
Tawes, and various other non-operators who owned the lessees' interest
under the Baker Lease, drilled the wells. Moose acted as operator for the
consenting parties in drilling the wells. Tawes and another company later
acquired Moose's working interest in the Baker Lease and the wells in a
foreclosure sale. "At issue in this case is Tawes' liability, as a Consenting
Party, for royalty respecting production from the Baker-Barnes 1 & 2
wells under the WIUA and JOA. '187
The JOA provided in Article VI.B2 that
[t]he entire cost and risk of conducting such operations shall be
borne by the Consenting Parties in the proportions they have elected
to bear .... 188 [I]n a subsequent portion of its Article VI the JOA
contains the statement that: "[d]uring the period of time Consenting
Parties are entitled to receive Non-Consenting Party's share of pro-
duction, or the proceeds therefrom, Consenting Parties shall be re-
sponsible for the payment of all production, severance, excise,
gathering and other taxes, and all royalty, overriding royalty and
other burdens applicable to Non-Consenting Party's share of produc-
tion .... 189
The Fifth Circuit called this the "Royalty Provision" for identification.
183. In re Moose Oil & Gas Co., 613 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 2010) (certified questions
accepted by Texas Supreme Court Aug. 6, 2010).




188. Id. at 525.
189. Id.
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Barnes asserted that Tawes, as a Consenting Party, was liable for all
royalty owed to her and that she had standing to sue under the Royalty
Provision as a third-party beneficiary of the JOA.
[A] contract creates a third-party creditor beneficiary only if the
signatories (1) intended to confer a benefit on that third party and
(2) entered the contract to confer that benefit on the third party.
The language of the contract must be clear, and the intent of the
contracting parties controls. [A] presumption exists that parties con-
tracted for themselves unless it 'clearly appears' that they intended a
third party to benefit from the contract... 19 That a contract inci-
dentally benefits some third party is insufficient to establish an intent
to create a third-party beneficiary. 191
Tawes contested third party liability.
Alternatively, Barnes argued that even if she was not a third-party
creditor beneficiary, she could recover against Tawes under a theory of
privity of estate. Liability to the original lessor for the payment of rent or
the performance of other lease covenants may arise from either privity of
contract or privity of estate.192 Barnes asserted '[t]hat Tawes came into
privity of estate with her by undertaking the obligation to pay royalty
under the Barnes Lease. ' 193 This argument was apparently based on the
reasoning that the original lessee must pay royalty to Barnes, Moose
agreed to pay the royalty owed by the original lessee, Tawes acquired
Moose's interest, and therefore Tawes must pay Barnes. It is unclear
whether the privity of estate argument is based on the Royalty Provision
in the JOA, the acquisition of Moose's leasehold estate by Tawes, or
both.194
The lower courts found Tawes to be liable and to be responsible for all
royalties. 195 The JOA in this case was similar to most JOAs because it
allocated all costs and expenses and the sharing of revenue in accordance
with an allocation based on the interests owned by the working interest
owners. 196 However, the Royalty Provision recited that "[c]onsenting
parties shall be responsible for the payment of. . . all royalty," and that
language was consistent with either joint or several liability for royalty
payments as between and among the Consenting Parties.197 Moreover,
the court noted in a footnote that there could also be a question as to
whether Tawes could be liable for all royalties even if that sum exceeded
Tawes's share of production. 198
190. Id. at 527 (citation omitted) (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Texas Utilities Elec-
tric Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. 1999)).
191. Id. (citing Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 586 (Tex. 2002)).
192. Id. at 528 (quoting Amco Trust Inc. v. Naylor, 317 S.W.2d 47, 50 (1958)).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 526-27, 529-30.





This case involved questions of Texas law as to which there was no
controlling Texas Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the Fifth Cir-
cuit certified the following as two of three questions to be submitted to
the Texas Supreme Court:
Certified Question One: Does Barnes have any right [to] enforce
the contract-the WIUA and JOA-between Dominion, Moose O&G,
and the Moose Assignees, including Tawes, to recover unpaid royal-
ties, between the date of first production and February 2002, of
Baker-Barnes Nos. 1 & 2 wells under what we have called the "Roy-
alty Provision" of the JOA, either as a third-party beneficiary of the
WIUA and JOA or by virtue of having privity of estate with Tawes?
Certified Question Three: If Tawes, as a Consenting Party, is re-
sponsible for royalties under the JOA, does the JOA Royalty Provi-
sion change the agreement within the JOA such that Tawes is
responsible for all of Barnes' unpaid royalty jointly and severally, or
does the JOA limit Tawes' liability for unpaid royalty to the extent of
his interest in the two wells at issue between the date of first produc-
tion and February 2002?199
Tawes also claimed that there was a contractual bar to recovery by
Barnes. If the contractual bar is sustained, then the Texas Supreme Court
might not reach the interesting questions described above. Provision V
of the WIUA provides that:
Moose Oil & Gas Company [a non-operator] shall be the liable
party to the Operator for the entire forty-six percent (46%) working
interest within the Working Interest Unit for the parties hereinabove
referred to as Moose [including Tawes]. Moose Oil & Gas Company
shall be the responsible party, for each of said parties, to the Opera-
tor for obtaining and delivering any and all elections, notices, in-
voices payments and billings. 200
However, the parties to the WIUA also agreed that they would be gov-
erned by the JOA that was attached to the WIUA as an exhibit.201
Tawes argued that the WIUA insulated him from liability.202 Even if
Barnes was a third-party creditor beneficiary, she could not enforce her
rights against Tawes because under the contracts, her lessee "could not
have enforced the Royalty Provision [in the JOA] against Tawes. ''20 3
Under the WIUA, Barnes's lessee could only recover from Moose, which
was designated as the liable party. Accordingly, Tawes contended that
the same is true for Barnes because "Barnes can have no greater rights to
reach Tawes than did [Barnes's lessee]. '20 4 The court also certified this
question to the Texas Supreme Court as follows: "Certified Question Two:
199. Id. at 531.
200. Id. at 524.
201. Id. at 525.
202. Id. at 529.
203. Id. at 528-29.
204. Id. at 529.
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If Barnes may enforce the contract, does the WIUA prevent Barnes from
recovering from Tawes?" 20 5
If the door is opened for lessors to assert that they are third-party ben-
eficiaries under this common form of JOA, then the case will be very
significant. There are many terms and provisions in a typical JOA that
arguably could tie back to implied or express lease covenants. While
there is no doubt that no one in the industry has actually intended that
result, except in the most unusual of documents, if the Texas Supreme
Court reads that intent into this form JOA, then the unintended conse-
quence of the use of the forms will be to significantly increase the risk of
liability for working interest owners. Working interest owners frequently
have little knowledge of the terms and conditions of leases included in a
unit, other than knowledge of their own leases. Even if they did have
knowledge of the actual recorded lease terms, due diligence would re-
quire inquiry into the unrecorded lease file materials of other working
interest owners, which are materials generally regarded to be at least bus-
iness confidential. Finally, if the liability for royalty payments is extended
to all royalty, even if it exceeds the working interest owner's share of
production, then very small working interest owners are assuming a very
big risk, particularly in today's environment of very large royalties in-
curred very quickly on horizontal wells.
V. REGULATIONS
In Discovery Operating, Inc. v. BP America Production Co., the East-
land Court of Appeals held that Texas Natural Resources Code Section
85.321 allows owners of production or property interests to bring negli-
gence per se claims based on violations of the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion (TRC) rules and orders.20 6 While drilling an oil well, Discovery
Operating, Inc. (Discovery) ran into a "highly pressurized flow of brine
water" that ultimately caused Discovery damages in the form of costs to
contain the flow, costs to plug and abandon the well, and lost production
profits. 20 7 Because Discovery had never encountered similar flows in the
area of the well, it investigated subsurface injection activity conducted by
other entities surrounding the well as a potential cause for the flow. 20 8
Discovery concluded that BP American Production Company's (BP)
nearby subsurface injection well was the cause for the flow, and it
brought negligence per se claims against BP based upon assertions that
BP had violated Section 85.045 of the Natural Resources Code as well as
various TRC rules.209
Based on the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Exxon Corp. v. Emer-
205. Id. at 531.
206. Discovery Operating, Inc. v. BP America Production Co., 311 S.W.3d 140, 161
(Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, pet. denied, reh'g filed).
207. Id. at 146, 148.
208. Id. at 147.
209. Id. at 148 (stating that Section 85.045 (which provides that waste is illegal and
prohibited, based on the definition of "waste" in Section 85.046)).
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ald Oil & Gas Co.,21° the Eastland Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court was erroneous in granting BP's summary judgment motion on the
negligence per se claims.211 The trial court did not have the benefit of the
Emerald opinion when it rendered its summary judgment ruling, but the
court of appeals held that Emerald expressly allowed the type of negli-
gence per se claims asserted by Discovery.212 Emerald dealt with a simi-
lar negligence per se claim that rested on violations of TRC rules brought
by a subsequent owner of mineral interests.213 The court stated that Em-
erald stood for the proposition "that [Texas Natural Resources Code]
Section 85.321 creates a private cause of action" for violations of TRC
rules or orders.2 14 Moreover, the courts have no discretion to determine
whether the statute will support a negligence per se claim.215 However,
the lessee in Emerald lacked standing because it was a subsequent lessee,
which was a limitation that did not apply to Discovery's claims because
Discovery was not a subsequent lessee. Because Discovery owned the
mineral interests when the alleged injury occurred, Discovery had the
right to bring its negligence per se claims regardless of "whether the
claims are labeled as a private cause of action for violations of statutes
and [TRC] rules and orders or as negligence per se claims for violations
of the same statutes, rules, and orders."2 16
The significance of this case is the court's recognition that Texas Natu-
ral Resources Code Section 85.321 creates a private cause of action for
negligence per se claims arising from violations of any TRC rule or order,
which may be asserted by the owners of the mineral interests who own
those interests at the time the injury occurs. This suggests there will be an
expanding field of claims based on TRC rules and orders not previously
seen as a basis for private causes of action.
Wickford, Inc. v. Energytec, Inc. (In re Energytec, Inc.) held that a ces-
sation of production caused by internal Texas Railroad Commission
(TRC) confusion did not operate to terminate a lease because it was be-
yond Lessee's control, but an unexplained delay in responding to a sec-
ond TRC severance did result in lease termination because it was within
Lessee's control.217 There were two separate TRC severance orders
based on unrelated facts. 218 Production first ceased in March 2008 be-
cause the TRC issued the first severance order relating to the improper
plugging of a well, although the TRC had previously approved the tech-
nique. Lessee used reasonable efforts to get the severance order lifted on
210. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., No. 05-0729, 2009 WL 795760 (Tex. Mar.
27, 2009), withdrawn, 331 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2010).
211. Discovery Operating, 311 S.W.3d at 161.
212. Id. at 160-61.
213. See id. at 160.
214. Id. at 161.
215. Id. at 163.
216. Id. at 161.
217. Wickford, Inc. v. Energytec, Inc., No. 09-41477, 2009 WL 5101765, at *5 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2009).
218. Id. at *2.
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January 20, 2009. However, the TRC had issued a second severance or-
der on January 16, 2009, regarding production imbalances. Lessee re-
ceived notice of the violation on December 17, 2008, but did not file the
necessary forms for more than three months. This second severance or-
der was lifted on March 25, 2009, but Lessee did not resume production
for another five months, delaying until August 2009.219 The force
majeure provision of the applicable lease provided:
If ... the performance by Lessee of any covenant, agreement, or re-
quirement hereof is delayed or interfered directly or indirectly by any
past or future acts, orders, regulations, or requirements ... of any state
.. or any agency... or authority of any [state],.. . or on account of any
other similar or dissimilar cause beyond the control of Lessee, the period
of such delay or interruption shall not be counted against the
Lessee .... 
220
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that be-
cause Lessee acted in good faith and used previously approved tech-
niques, Lessee had no control over the internal TRC confusion.221
Therefore, Lessee's interest in the minerals did not terminate as a result
of the cessation caused by the TRC's first severance order. 222
However, the court found the cessation of production attributable to
the second severance order was within Lessee's control.22 3 It is unclear
whether the court considered the critical fact to be the three month delay
in responding to the TRC, or the five month delay in resuming produc-
tion. Because the court held that the lease terminated in March 2009, this
implies that the critical fact was the three month delay in responding to
the TRC.224
There was another lease on another property in this case, which the
court also held had terminated based on a cessation of production.225 As
to that lease, the court held the termination was effective as of the date
the well was first shut-in.226 Because there is almost no discussion in the
opinion as to the term during which Lessee was permitted to resume pro-
duction, it is not clear that this court correctly addressed the specific date
of either of the lease terminations; therefore, it may be incorrect to con-
clude that the court's recital of the effective date of lease termination is
evidence of its reasoning as to the cause of the termination.
The case is significant because of the holding that internal confusion at
the TRC may excuse performance under the force majeure clause in a
lease. This force majeure clause expressly included administrative action
as a possible basis for a suspension of Lessee's obligations. The internal
219. Id. at *2-3.
220. Id. at *5.
221. Id. at *4.
222. Id.






confusion was beyond Lessee's control. However, a delay in responding
to a TRC severance order is within Lessee's control, and it appears that,
in this case, the court held that the delay in responding was enough to
terminate the lease.
VI. CONCLUSION
During the reporting period, there was little of interest out of the Texas
Supreme Court, but there are many cases in which a petition for review
has been filed or granted. This suggests that next year may be a big year
for decisions out of the Texas Supreme Court. The reported cases are
following the usual boom cycle of the industry. For the past several years,
the decisions have been dominated by opinions focused on title, leases,
leasing, and royalty. The cases this year have shifted the focus to the later
stage of development where industry agreements become important. The
more interesting cases deal with operating agreements, purchase and sale
agreements, gas contacts, area of mutual interest agreements, and other
industry contracts. Historically, there have been surprisingly few cases on
operating agreements, but they are now receiving a great deal of atten-
tion. If lessors are determined to be third-party beneficiaries of operating
agreements, then the trend will certainly accelerate.
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